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Abstract
Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous
economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned.
Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient
play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.
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1 Introduction
The social norms literature has extended the study of cooperation in infinitely
repeated games from the case of stable partnerships (Rubinstein, 1979; Fudenberg
and Maskin, 1986) to unstable meetings among homogeneous strangers (Kandori,
1992; Ellison, 1994). Patient strangers can attain the efficient outcome by trig-
gering community-wide responses to privately observed defections (“grim” play).
However, this requires sufficiently small groups. Large groups must be able to
publicly monitor defections, which makes the economy’s size irrelevant, and ho-
mogeneity greatly reduces the information that must be shared; since full coop-
eration is efficient, knowing that not everyone acted identically is sufficient. The
open question is how results change when strangers are heterogeneous. Here, the
structure of incentives may vary across meetings and efficient play may require
some players to cooperate and others not.
We study social norms among heterogeneous strangers. Players receive iid pro-
ductivity shocks, so payoff matrices stochastically vary across meetings, and can be
asymmetric. Before choosing an action, players see productivities in their match.
If full cooperation is efficient, publicly exposing defections supports cooperation;
heterogeneity simply alters the admissible discount factors relative to the homo-
geneous case. Otherwise, if occasional defections are part of efficient play, then we
need contagious punishments to support high payoffs because publicly exposing
defections without productivities in other matches cannot reveal off-equilibrium
play. Contagious punishment can deter defections only under moderate produc-
tivity differences.
The analysis has merit because little exists about cooperation under hetero-
geneity. The closest paper is Blonski and Spagnolo (2015), an infinitely repeated
PD game in fixed pairs where cooperation is efficient but asymmetrically benefits
players. The technique we present generates tractable closed-form expressions for
continuation payoffs, which can be employed to calibrate laboratory economies.
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2 Model
In every periodN ≥ 4 (even) players are paired with uniform probability (Kandori,
1992; Ellison, 1994). Subsequently, each player i = 1, . . . , N , draws a random iid
productivity shock θi ∈ {1, α}, α > 1: θi = α (productive) with probability q, and
θi = 1 (unproductive) otherwise. A match between i and opponent −i is either
symmetric (θi = θ−i) or asymmetric. Payoffs are in Figure 1.
Player −i
C D
Player i
C θic, θ−ic −l, θi(c+ g)
D θ−i(c+ g), −l 0, 0
Figure 1: The game between player i and −i.
Let c, g, l > 0 and θic > θig − l. The cooperative outcome (C,C) maximizes
total earnings if
c ≥ αg − l, (1)
thus amounting to a proper Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD). Otherwise, we have an
asymmetric social dilemma where D is dominant but asymmetric cooperation,
(D,C) or (C,D), is efficient. Iterated PDs in fixed pairs assume (1) to rule out
taking turns at selecting C and D (e.g., Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). Inter-
estingly, Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) do not assume (1), possibly because
pairs are short-lived and break up over time, which complicates coordination on
action alternation.
Before choosing, players observe productivities only in their match, not in oth-
ers. At the period’s end players are informed if everyone chose identically or not.
Full defection is an equilibrium—giving payoff 0—because D is a best response
to D by everyone else. Other equilibria exist. If (1) holds, public monitoring
supports full cooperation. Everyone chooses C unless someone acted differently,
in which case everyone chooses D forever. This equilibrium exists—independent
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of N—if
β ≥ c(α− 1) + gα
qc(α− 1) + α(c+ g) ∈ (0, 1).
If (1) does not hold, the available public information is no longer useful to
attain efficiency. Earnings in matches with unequal productivities are maximized
by asymmetric cooperation; hence, (C,D) is part of efficient play. As players
cannot see productivities in other matches, making defections public cannot reveal
deviations from efficient play.
Hence, consider community-based enforcement triggered by privately observed
deviations. Players cooperate whenever their productivity is no smaller than their
opponent’s; otherwise, they defect. If they observe someone choosing D when C
should be chosen, then they switch to play “always defect.”
Definition 1 (Asymmetric cooperation). At the start of any period, player
i either (i) “cooperates” by choosing C if θi ≥ θ−i, and D otherwise, or (ii)
“punishes” by unconditionally choosing D. Player i follows “cooperate” but per-
manently switches to “punish” if someone deviates to D when C should be chosen.
The equilibrium payoff is (1− β)−1pi∗, where
pi∗ = q2αc+ (1− q)2c+ (1− q)q(αc+ αg − l)
denotes expected period earnings.
Theorem 1. Fix q. If c
g
is sufficiently small, then there exists α ∈ (α, αq) such
that if β and l are sufficiently large, then asymmetric cooperation is a sequential
equilibrium.
The conditions on discounting β and sucker’s payoff l are standard. Players
must be patient to prefer C to D in equilibrium; the sucker’s payoff must be
sufficiently large for punishment to be incentive-compatible. The new conditions
involve temptation payoff and productivity parameter. Productivities cannot be
too different or productive players would avoid punishing in asymmetric meetings.
The proof follows.
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2.1 Contagious punishment
When everyone follows the strategy in Definition 1, partition the population into
N −k cooperators and k ∈ κ := (1, . . . , N)T defectors. Cooperators follow equilib-
rium play; Defectors only play D. The economy is off-equilibrium if k ≥ 2; k = 1
denotes when player i moves off-equilibrium in a match θi ≥ θ−i. Indeed, player i
has no incentive to deviate to C from D if θi < θ−i.
The N ×N upper-triangular transition matrix
QN =

Q11 Q12 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 Q22 Q23 Q24 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 Q33 Q34 Q35 Q36 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . QN−1,N−1 QN−1,N
0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 1

(2)
describes the contagious punishment process.
The first row applies if i moves off-equilibrium when θi ≥ θ−i, with probability
Q12 = 1 − q(1 − q). This triggers contagious punishment, gradually bringing the
economy to full defection. Q11 = (1 − q)q is the probability that θi < θ−i, so no
punishment is triggered.
In the second row there are two defectors i = `,m. The number of defectors
doubles with probability Q24, if they both are in mixed matches where θi ≥ θ−i. If
the defectors meet each other or are in matches where θi < θ−i, then the number
of defectors does not increase (with probability Q22). If only one defector i = `,m
is in a mixed match with θi ≥ θ−i, then there is only one additional defector, with
probability Q23.
Not all mixed matches—cooperator-defector matches—contribute to spread
punishment since D is part of equilibrium play. This is the central difference
with homogeneous economies Kandori (1992). When cooperator i meets defector
−i and θi > θ−i, i will not start defecting since −i follows equilibrium play. This
match occurs with probability q(1−q), so, if there are j mixed matches, contagion
occurs in n < j of those with probability
(
j
n
)
[1− q(1− q)]n[q(1− q)]j−n.
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A transition from k ≥ 2 to k′ ≥ k defectors occurs with probability
Qkk′(N) :=
min(k,N−k)∑
j=k′−k
λkj
(
j
k′ − k
)
[1− q(1− q)]k′−k[q(1− q)]j−k′+k,
where N is omitted in QN . The probability of j mixed matches
λkj :=
j!
(
k
j
)(
N−k
j
)
(k − j − 1)!!(N − k − j − 1)!!
(N − 1)!! ,
is the number of such pairings divided by the number (N−1)!! of possible pairings,
where
j ∈ Jk :=
 {0, 2, 4, . . . ,min(k,N − k)} if k = even{1, 3, 5, . . . ,min(k,N − k)} if k = odd.
2.2 Off-equilibrium continuation payoffs
Let player i be one of k ≥ 1 defectors. She meets one of N − k cooperators with
probability σk :=
N − k
N − 1 . Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σN−1, 0)
T and ek be theN−dimensional
column vector with 1 in the kst position and 0 everywhere else.
From Camera and Gioffre´ (2014, Theorem 2), the rate at which a defector
expects to meet cooperators in the continuation game is
φk := (1− β)eTk (I − βQN)−1σ, k ≥ 1, (3)
where lim
β→1−
φk
1− β <∞.
The beginning-of-period payoff to defector i is
vk = σkpi + β
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′vk′ , for k ≥ 1, (4)
where
pi := (c+ g)[qα + (1− q)2]
denotes earnings expected ex-ante in a mixed match.
Letting v := (v1, . . . , vN)T, we have
v = σpi + βQNv ⇒ v = (I − βQN)−1σpi,
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and we have vk+1 ≤ vk with
vk = eTk (I − βQN)−1σpi =
piφk
1− β . (5)
2.3 Equilibrium deviations
Deviating to D in symmetric matches θi = θ−i = θ is suboptimal if
θc+ β pi
∗
1− β ≥ θ(c+ g) + βv2. (6)
Here θi = θ−i = α represents the most stringent case, and we have
αc+ β pi
∗
1− β − α(c+ g)− βv2 = −αg +
βpi∗
1− β −
βφ2pi
1− β . (7)
Since lim
β→1
φk
1− β < ∞ for all k ≥ 1, and pi
∗ > 0, by continuity there exists a
β∗s ∈ (0, 1) such that (6) holds for β ∈ [β∗s , 1) and θ = 1, α.
Deviating to D in asymmetric matches θi > θ−i is suboptimal for i if
−l + β pi
∗
1− β ≥ βv2, (8)
or equivalently
βpi∗
1− β −
βφ2pi
1− β ≥ l.
Using again lim
β→1
φk
1− β <∞ and pi
∗ > 0, by continuity there exists β∗a ∈ (0, 1) such
that (8) holds for all β ∈ [β∗a, 1). Letting β∗ := max(β∗a, β∗s ) equilibrium deviations
are suboptimal if β ∈ [β∗, 1).
2.4 Off-equilibrium deviations
When k ≥ 2 a deviation occurs when defector i chooses C instead of D, in a match
where θi ≥ θ−i.
Asymmetric matches. If θi > θ−i, defector i surely earns −l since the other
selects D. The deviation slows down contagion if −i is a cooperator, with probabil-
ity σk. The transition matrix QN−2 with elements Qkk′(N−2) describes contagion
in all other meetings.
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The payoff to defector i from deviating is
−l +
i meets a cooperator︷ ︸︸ ︷
σkβ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+1 +
i meets a defector︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− σk)β
N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2 . (9)
Continuation payoffs depend on whether −i is a cooperator or not. If she is, devi-
ating limits future defectors to k′+1 instead of k′+2. The transition probabilities
Qk−1,k′(N−2) account for this by considering all matchings among k−1 defectors
(k defectors excluding i) and N − k− 1 cooperators (N − k cooperators excluding
−i). Here, deviating raises i’s continuation payoff, because vk′ falls in k′. If i
meets a defector no such benefit exists; the transition probabilities Qk−2,k′(N − 2)
account for this meeting by considering all matchings among k − 2 defectors (k
defectors excluding i and −i) and N − k cooperators. Deviating to C (instead of
D) is suboptimal if
− l + σkβ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+1 + (1− σk)β
N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2
≤ σkβ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+2 + (1− σk)β
N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2,
that is
σkβ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)(vk′+1 − vk′+2) ≤ l, for k ≥ 2.
Using vk:
σkpiβ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)φk′+1 − φk′+21− β ≤ l, for k ≥ 2. (10)
Symmetric matches. If θi = θ−i, the expected payoff to defector i who deviates
to C from D when k ≥ 2 is
σk
i meets a cooperator︷ ︸︸ ︷[
θic+ β
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+1
]
+(1−σk)
i meets a defector︷ ︸︸ ︷[
− l + β
N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2
]
.
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Deviating is suboptimal if
σkθic+ (1− σk)(−l) + σkβ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+1 + (1− σk)β
N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2
≤ σkθi(c+ g) + σkβ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+2 + (1− σk)β
N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2,
yielding
σkβ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)(vk′+1 − vk′+2) ≤ σkθig + (1− σk)l,
or equivalently
σkpiβ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)φk′+1 − φk′+21− β ≤ σkθig + (1− σk)l, (11)
most stringent when θi = 1.
From Camera and Gioffre´ (2014, Theorem 2), the most stringent case for (10)
and (11) is k = 2. A sufficient condition to avoid off-equilibrium deviations is
piγq ≤ min(g, l), (12)
where
γq := sup
β∈(0,1)
N−2∑
k′=1
Q1,k′(N − 2)βφk′+1 − φk′+21− β .
Lemma 1. For all q ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ N+, the function γq ∈ (0, 1).
The proof is in Appendix. Using the definition of pi, (12) becomes
γq[qα + (1− q2)] ≤ min(g, l)
c+ g .
From Lemma 1 γq < 1, so if g < l, a necessary condition for (12) is
α < αq :=
1− γq(1− q)2
γqq
.
Since l < αg − c two cases arise.
1. l ≤ g: l < αg − c implies α > l + c
g
, which holds if α > g + c
g
.
2. g < l < αg − c: we need g < αg − c, implying α > c+ g
g
.
Hence, letting α := c+ g
g
, if c/g is sufficiently small, then there exists α ∈
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(α, αq) ensuring that deviating off-equilibrium is suboptimal.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
The cases q = 0 and q = 1 are in Camera and Gioffre´ (2014). For q ∈ (0, 1)
γq(β) :=
N−2∑
k′=1
Q1,k′(N − 2)βφk′+1 − φk′+21− β
= q(1− q)βφ2 − φ31− β + [1− q(1− q)]β
φ3 − φ4
1− β .
For any β ∈ (0, 1) and ∀k ≥ 1 we have φk > φk+1 (Camera and Gioffre´, 2014,
Theorem 2), so γq(β) > 0. To show that γq < 1, the payoff v2 is
v2 = σ2
{
pi + β
[ i transmits the defection︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− q(1− q)
)N−2∑
k′=1
Q1,k′(N − 2)vk′+2 +
i does not transmit the defection︷ ︸︸ ︷
q(1− q)
N−2∑
k′=1
Q1,k′(N − 2)vk′+1
]}
+
i meets the other defector︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− σ2)
[
d+ βv2
]
,
or, equivalently,
v2 = σ2(pi − d) + d+ σ2β[1− q(1− q)]{q(1− q)v3 + [1− q(1− q)]v4}
+ σ2βq(1− q){q(1− q)v2 + [1− q(1− q)]v3}+ (1− σ2)βv2.
Rearranging
σ2[1− q2(1− q)2]β(v2 − v3) = σ2(pi − d) + d− v2(1− β)− σ2β[1− q(1− q)]2(v3 − v4),
and using (5)
β
φ2 − φ3
1− β =
1
1− q2(1− q)2
(
1− φ2
σ2
)
− [1− q(1− q)]
2
1− q2(1− q)2 β
φ3 − φ4
1− β . (13)
Using the definition of γq(β):
γq(β) =
q(1− q)
1− q2(1− q)2
(
1− φ2
σ2
)
+ [1− q(1− q)]
2
1− q2(1− q)2 β
φ3 − φ4
1− β .
and since φ3 − φ4 ≤ φ2 − φ3 (see Camera and Gioffre´, 2014, Theorem 2) we have
γq(β) ≤ q(1− q)1− q2(1− q)2
(
1− φ2
σ2
)
+ [1− q(1− q)]
2
1− q2(1− q)2 β
φ2 − φ3
1− β .
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Again using (13):
γq(β) ≤
≤1 ∀q∈[0,1]︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 + q2(1− q)2
[1 + q(1− q)][1− q2(1− q)2]
<1︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− φ2
σ2
)
−
≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[1− q(1− q)]4
[1− q2(1− q)2]2β
φ3 − φ4
1− β < 1
where we used φ2 < σ2, as proved in Camera and Gioffre´ (2014, Theorem 2).
Taking the supremum of γq(β) concludes the proof.
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